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ARGUMENT 
L THE PLAINTIFF NEED NOT ELIMINATE ALL POSSIBLE INFERENCES OF 
NEGLIGENCE. BUT ONLY PROVE THAT THE BALANCE OF PROBABILITIES 
WEIGH IN FAVOR OF NEGLIGENCE1 
The Statement of Facts in Defendant's Brief highlights a misunderstanding of the 
standard of review to be applied in this case, as well as the standard which the trial court should 
have applied below. In regard to whether an instruction of res ipsa loquitur should be given at 
all, the Utah Supreme Court in Anderton v. Montgomery. 607 P.2d 828, 833-34 (Utah 1980) 
stated: 
It is to be noted that the weighing of evidence presented to establish the [elements 
of res ipsa loquitur], like all other questions of fact, is within the provence of the 
jury; where the trial court determines that the evidence, viewed in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, could establish the prerequisites to the application of the 
doctrine, an instruction to that effect is proper. 
Thus, the evidence in this case need not compel an application of res ipsa loquitur; the evidence 
must only provide some basis for its application. 
Likewise, in reviewing a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appellate court 
must view all the testimony and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom in plaintiff's favor 
and must disregard all conflicting evidence. The judgment notwithstanding the verdict may only 
be sustained in the absence of any substantial evidence to support the verdict. Coer v. Mavfair 
fallow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah 1985); See accord. Judge Boyd L. Park 
at the trial of the present matter: "Well, I don't think to get to a res ipsa case that you have to 
rule out everything in the world." R.1017, See Addendum D in Appellant's principle brief. 
1 
Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967). Accordingly, when the defendant claims that 
plaintiff is misconstruing, misinterpreting, or taking comments out of context, all such analysis 
only addresses the weight to be given to the evidence. In the current posture of this case, 
however, all conflicting evidence must be disregarded. It must be assumed that the jury 
accepted the interpretation which the plaintiff gave to the testimony and evidence cited in her 
brief. 
Defendant's contention that comments made by witnesses constituted speculation 
or conjecture, or were somehow explained away by witnesses proves nothing. There is no issue 
on appeal as to admissibility of any evidence. Instead, the jury was free to look at the evidence 
which was admitted, whether speculative or not. Thus, when Dr. Parish speaking for Parish 
Chemical admitted facts which raised an inference of negligence by virtue of res ipsa loquitur, 
the jury was at liberty to rely on that statement. Dr. Parish answered that it was fair to state 
that the fire either had to start in one of two ways: either someone went into Stockroom A and 
started the fire intentionally or there was an improper storage of the chemicals. (R.933-34). 
Again, Dr. Parish's attempts to back off of this statement go to the evidence's weight, not to its 
probative value, and certainly cannot be brushed aside when the issue before this court is 
whether a prima facie case had been made out. There was no evidence of arson. Thus, by 
Parish's own admission, with arson discounted, the only other cause of the fire was negligence. 
2 
IL THE ACCIDENT OR INJURY IN THIS CASE WAS CAUSED BY A 
FORCE THAT WAS CONTROLLED ONLY BY THE DEFENDANT IN THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL LIKELY CAUSES OF 
THE ACCIDENT OR INJURY2 
Defendant claims that plaintiffs claim fails allegedly because was unable to trace 
a cause of the fire to an instrument for which the defendant was responsible, citing Barnhill v. 
Young Electric Sign Co., 374 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1962). This holding by the Barnhill court 
must be reconciled with subsequent statements of the Utah Supreme Court regarding res ipsa 
loquitur. For example, in Anderton v. Montgomery. 607 P.2d 828 (Utah 1980), the court 
explained: 
It is often the case that a plaintiff, while suffering injury which was caused by a 
force or agency allegedly instigated by defendant's conduct, is unable to produce 
evidence pinpointing a given act or omission on the part of defendant which 
breached illegally imposed standard of care. Where this is the case, the law 
permits a plaintiff to withdraw from the specific conduct constituting negligence, 
and concentrate upon presenting evidence probative of circumstances which would 
permit the trier of fact to infer the defendant had engaged in negligent conduct to 
the injury of the plaintiff. 
Id. at 833 (emphasis added). Thus, a plaintiff does not have to pinpoint, or trace with 
particularity, the given act or omission on the part of the defendant which breached his duty. 
Instead, the plaintiff, as she did in this case, is only required to present evidence probative of 
2Second element of res ipsa loquitur as found in Model Utah Jury Instruction 4.1. See 
Dallev v. Utah Valley Regional Med. Cntr.. 791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990); Ballow v. Monroe. 699 
P.2d 719 (Utah 1985); Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1984); 
Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 (Utah 1980); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care. 
Inc.. 740 P.2d 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
3 
circumstances upon which a jury might infer negligence. A reading of the evidence, in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, evidences that the plaintiff did in fact present evidence probative 
of the circumstances which would permit the trier of fact to infer that defendant had engaged in 
negligent conduct. Obviously the jury came to this conclusion. The jury in this case found 
Parish Chemical negligent. 
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated in 1985 in Ballow v. Monroe. 699 P.2d 719, 
722 (Utah 1985), that a plaintiff need not eliminate all possible inferences of non-negligence, 
but only prove the balance of probabilities weigh in favor of negligence. It is absurd under a 
theory of res ipsa loquitur to contend that a plaintiff must show exactly what happened in order 
to go forward. If the plaintiff could show the actual act which caused the accident, res ipsa 
loquitur not only would not be required, but would be disallowed. Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel 
Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1984). 
On two separate occasions, this court has considered the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur and has held: 
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence which allows a party, in certain 
circumstances, to raise an inference that another party has acted negligently, 
notwithstanding a lack of evidence concerning the other party's actions. 
Kitchen v. CalGas Co.. Inc.. 821 P.2d 458, 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)(emphasis added). 
Further, this court has stated that the "application of res ipsa loquitur presupposes a plaintiff's 
inability to point to a specific allegedly negligent act which caused the injury." Hornsbv v. 
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop. 758 P.2d 929, 934 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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Addressing this second element of res ipsa loquitur, the Utah Supreme Court in 
King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858 (Utah 1992) held: 
The second element, exclusivity of management or control, should not be rigidly 
applied. Rather, that element should focus on the degree of a defendant's 
management or control necessary to provide a persuasive inference of liability on 
the defendant's part. 
In other words, something less than exclusive management or control may suffice to make out 
a prima facie case of res ipsa loquitur. To establish the second requirement, the plaintiff need 
only show "that it is more likely than not that the defendant was the party responsible for the 
injury." IdL at 862, citing Ballow, 699 P.2d at 721. Rather than restate the evidence as 
provided in plaintiff's principle brief, plaintiff will defer to the trial court's statement while the 
evidence was fresh in the trial court's conscience: 
There is no question that Parish Chemical had control of the building, had control 
of the chemicals, had set up a variety of safety features to prevent people from 
interloping on the property to prevent stealing, to prevent accidents of any kind. 
There is no question about that they have done that. That means then that is 
strictly within their control. That those chemicals do not erupt and they do not 
have a force of fire and whether there is an explosion or not may be or may be 
not, but there has to be a source in which the fire can go in order to continue. 
That source obviously was in that room. 
(R.1016, See Addendum D in Plaintiff's principle brief). At no time did Parish Chemical or 
its employees relinquish control of the building to any persons prior to the fire. Thus, exclusive 
control was established and the instrumentality causing the damage in this case, the chemicals, 
was identified. The chemicals were the only materials that could burn in the stockroom, and 
whether ignition was by blow torch, spark, burning light ballast, or otherwise, the 
5 
instrumentality under the defendant's control which caused the problem was the chemicals 
themselves. 
Defendant contends: "Res ipsa loquitur has no application in the absence of 
evidence showing what instrumentality caused the fire." See Defendant's Brief at 25. 
Defendant's statement ignores recent Utah Supreme Court law. In Dallev v. Utah Valley 
Regional Medical Ctr.. 791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a case 
where a patient brought a medical malpractice suit due to a burn to her leg which occurred 
during surgery. The trial court had granted summary judgment for the defendants upon the basis 
that the plaintiff had not shown through expert testimony that the accident was of a kind which 
would not normally occur absent negligence,3 and had further failed to establish what 
instrumentality caused the burn. IcL at 195. Additionally, the plaintiff admitted that she did not 
know which of the defendants had actually caused the burn. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed holding: 
A better-reasoned approach would be to allow a plaintiff to use either of two 
methods to prove causation: A plaintiff may prove causation either by tracing the 
injury "to a specific instrumentality or cause for which the defendant was 
responsible" or by showing "that the defendant was responsible for all reasonably 
probable causes to which the accident could be attributed. . . . Many cases have 
allowed the plaintiffs to make such a showing through circumstantial evidence by 
using res ipsa loquitur." 
3This is the same claim that the defendants in me present case are making. Defendant 
claims that plaintiff cannot base her claim upon res ipsa loquitur absent expert testimony. As 
will be explained hereafter, the plaintiff showed circumstantial evidence upon which a lay person 
could reasonably conclude that this fire would probably not have occurred absent negligence. 
6 
Id. at 197(emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court buttressed its holding by the example of 
Shannon v. Jailer, 217 N.E.2d 234 (1966) which held "that the term 'instrumentality,' when 
used in connection with a res ipsa loquitur case, has a much broader meaning than a specific 
object or thing and could include an agency or occurrence.ff IdL at 198. In the present matter, 
therefore, the plaintiff has proven her case under both methods allowed in Dallev for res ipsa 
loquitur cases. Plaintiff traced her injury as resulting from the smoke emitted by Stockroom A 
and the chemicals stored there. These chemicals were the only combustible materials in 
Stockroom A. At the very least, plaintiff showed that the defendant was responsible for all 
reasonably probable causes for the fire. As a result, the case was properly submitted to the jury, 
whose verdict should be reinstated. 
It should be noted that the court in Dallev concluded: 
Once the plaintiff has utilized res ipsa loquitur to establish the inference that no 
one but defendant ] could have had control of the instrumentality that caused the 
injury, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to [the defendant] to 
show that the injury could have been caused by a person or instrumentality 
outside of defendant's control. 
Id. at 199(emphasis added). In this case, Parish Chemical did not carry this burden as is 
reflected by the jury's verdict. 
In support of the Barnhill statement that the plaintiff must trace the cause of the 
fire to a specific instrumentality for which the defendant was responsible, the plaintiff, as well 
as the court in Barnhill, places emphasis on Emigh v. Andrews, 191 P.2d 901 (Kan. 1948). It 
should be noted that the defendant also places emphasis on other cases concerning Kansas law, 
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such as Appalachian Ins. Co. v. G.B. Knutson, 242 F.Supp. 226 (W.D. Mo. 1965), which also 
relies on the Emigh decision. 
However, the Kansas Supreme Court, like the Supreme Court of Utah, has not 
been silence since the Emigh decision. Just as the Utah Supreme Court has more clearly defined 
the bounds of res ipsa loquitur since the Barnhill decision, the Kansas Supreme Court has made 
numerous statements since Emigh. In Primm v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 249 P.2d 647 
(Kan. 1952), an explosion occurred inside a power plant. The plaintiff pleaded that he was 
working as a brick layer at the plant; that the plant produced electricity by burning gas, oil, and 
coal; that the plant, boilers, buildings, and equipment were under the exclusive control of the 
defendant; that an explosion occurred in the room where the plaintiff was working, and that the 
explosion occurred because of "gaseous fumes and vapors the exact content of which was 
unknown to plaintiff." 
The defendant in Primm denied the explosions were due to any fault or negligence 
or that it had any knowledge as to the cause of the explosions, and instead "alleged the 
explosions constituted an accident for which it was in no way responsible," much like Parish has 
done in this case. A trial court granted the defendant's Motion for a Judgment on the Pleadings. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas stated: 
As we understand its brief, appellee's contentions in support of the trial court's 
ruling rest primarily on its contention the only thing pleaded is that an explosion 
occurred and that the mere happening thereof furnished no basis for a 
presumption of negligence, citing (several cases including Emigh); and other 
authorities which so hold; and its further contention that the petitions do not plead 
8 
any initial or foundation fact, as for instance, that the boiler exploded; that the 
sole allegation is there was an explosion speaks for itself, and that such pleading 
is insufficient under the Emigh case, supra, where it was held that a failure to 
plead an initial or foundation fact left the petition insufficient. Expanding its 
argument that there must have been an instrumentality or thing under the 
defendant's exclusive control which caused the injury, appellee says that it will 
not be contended that its buildings were instrumentalities, but that all that is 
alleged is that the buildings exploded or not that something in the buildings 
exploded, but that it is not alleged what exploded. In our opinion, this argument 
overlooks or ignores the plain allegation that gaseous fumes and vapors 
exploded.4 Appellee says further that if the explosion resulted from gas, there 
would have been no explosion without the gas being ignited, and the court is 
going to have to assume there was an emission and what caused it and that this 
may not be done . . . it must be apparent that if plaintiff knew what ignited the 
gas they would have been in a position to allege specific acts of negligence and 
the doctrine would then not be applicable. 
Id. at 642 (emphasis added). The Primm court concluded by saying: 
In our opinion the circumstances pleaded are such that if the proof on trial 
established their existence [that the building exploded], a prime facie case for 
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would have been made. 
Id. at 653. In this case, if the plaintiff knew what ignited the chemicals and how that ignition 
was accomplished, the plaintiff would have been in a position to allege specific acts of 
negligence and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would not be applicable to the present case. 
Thus, even the Emigh court, on which the Barnhill case is founded, recognizes that when a party 
must trace the cause of a fire to an instrumentality, one is not talking about specific acts, 
including what ignited the chemicals in this case. 
Similarly, the Kansas court clarified the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in Kansas 
4Much like plaintiff's current allegations that chemicals burned. 
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in Kitchen v. Smith, 334 P.2d 413 (Kan. 1959). In Kitchen, the plaintiff alleged that a hay 
bailer "caused matters of a combustible quantity" to come into contact with the prairie grass and 
start a fire. On appeal, the issue was whether the allegations in the amended complaint stated 
a cause of action. The defendant argued that there are many items that can be considered 
combustible, "and that none of these items coming in contact with the prairie hay, not being in 
a state of combustion themselves, would ignite and cause a fire." IcL at 415. Accordingly, the 
defendant argued, the allegations precluded any finding that the defendant caused the fire.5 The 
defendant in Kitchen went on to cite Emigh in his brief, arguing that if the plaintiff had alleged 
that sparks from a tractor caused the hay to ignite, he would have come within the rule. The 
Kansas Supreme Court replied that Emigh is good law, "where it has application." The obvious 
implication of this statement being that Emigh does not apply to every case and every fact 
pattern. The Kitchen court went on to say: 
It is clear that it is sufficient to establish a prime facie case based on res ipsa 
loquitur without stating in general allegations, hereunder attack, the means by 
which the bailer unit caused the fire. In this respect it was sufficient to allege 
that the hay bailer unit started the fire which damaged the plaintiff in the 
particulars alleged. 
Id. at 418-19. The court concluded its analysis and supported its position by quoting from 
Primm v. Kansas, already discussed. Thus, this court should note the Kansas Supreme Court 
itself has held that the Emigh decision is not controlling in every fact pattern, including fire 
interestingly, this is the exact same argument the defendant in this case makes on page 
7 of its brief in its "Fact" statement. 
10 
cases. 
Finally, in Rudy v. Whalev, 360 P.2d 863 (Kan. 1961), the Kansas Supreme 
Court followed its decision in Kitchen. In Rudy, a gas transport truck caught fire while off 
loading and a plaintiff's gas station burned to the ground. The plaintiff alleged that the transport 
caught fire and that the fire from the truck and the tanks caught the gas station on fire. The 
plaintiff also alleged that it was impossible to determine the exact point of origin of the fire, 
"except that it was in the immediate vicinity of the transport and tanks. . . " IcL at 867. Not 
surprisingly, the defendants argued that the plaintiff had failed "to allege the thing or 
instrumentality, namely, the truck, caused the damage; that it was a matter of conjecture whether 
the fire was caused by the instrumentality or whether the fire resulted from some other cause." 
Id. The defendants in Rudy, just like the defendants in the present case, cited Emigh. Using 
almost exactly the same language as the Kansas Supreme Court did in Kitchen, the court 
concluded, 
It is clear that the petition is sufficient to establish a prima facie case based on res 
ipsa loquitur without alleging generally the means by which the transport truck 
caught on fire. In this respect, it is sufficient to allege that the defendant's truck 
unit caught on fire and that the fire from the same caught the service station of 
the plaintiff's on fire, burning it to the ground. 
Id, at 868. 
In sum, defendant's position that the present matter is not amenable to an 
application of res ipsa loquitur does not reflect Utah law as embodied by Dalley, nor does it 
even comport with Kansas law upon which the defendant ostensibly relies. Under the present 
11 
circumstances as shown by the evidence, the trial court committed error in granting the 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. The jury's verdict should be reinstated. 
IIL THE FIRE AT PARISH CHEMICAL WAS OF A KIND WHICH DOES NOT 
OCCUR ABSENT NEGLIGENCE 
The plaintiff in this case did not stand before the jury and say: "No one knows 
how this fire started and therefore you must find for me." Instead, the plaintiff put on exacting 
testimony showing the jury what chemicals were stored in the room and outlining the entire 
construction of the room. Based upon that evidence, the jury was able to make a determination 
as to whether a fire in this room, under the circumstances of this case, would have been the kind 
of fire to start absent negligence. 
Plaintiff cites in her original brief the case of Olswanger v. Funk, 470 S.W. 2d 
13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970), as a demonstration of the correct way to analyze the first res ipsa 
element. Defendant brushes aside this case writing "this was a 'couch fire' case." See 
Defendant's brief at 20. Defendant's distinction is specious. In fact, defendant's argument 
highlights how the plaintiff in this case in fact established the first element of res ipsa loquitur. 
Just as the Olswanger case was a "couch fire" case, the present case was a "chemical storage 
room fire" case. What these cases highlight is that in both instances, the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding the fires should be reviewed in making a determination of whether 
they are fires which normally would occur absent negligence. One cannot simply throw up their 
hands and say: "This case involved a fire, therefore res ipsa loquitur is not applicable." 
12 
Instead, the circumstances of each case individually must be examined. Here, the 
jury applied common sense and personal experience to come to the conclusion that steel shelves, 
metal lathe, plaster, cinder block, and reinforced concrete do not burn.6 The jury must have 
believed the Parish Chemical plant manager who was in charge of safety when he explained that 
there were no electrical motors, no lab equipment, reactor vessels, heaters or baseboard heaters 
or similar appliances in Stockroom A.7 Finally, the jury must have respected the learned 
opinion of Wesley Parish, Phd., when he explained: "[T]he only sources for the fire . . . in the 
building, were the chemicals themselves and their potentially reactive capabilities." (R. 936). 
Thus, plaintiff had shown evidence probative of circumstances which would permit the trier of 
fact to infer that the defendant had engaged in negligent conduct. 
The sum and substance of plaintiff's case is that absent negligence, there would 
not have been a fire. As the trial court below recognized: 
Now how the fire got to that source [the chemicals] without there being some 
spillage is really, in my mind, an impossibility. If there is no spillage of any of 
the chemicals or if there was no explosion to blow the chemicals off the shelves 
so that they can be broken and then exposed, the then only other way is, in my 
view, is that there has to be some inference of negligence in which these 
chemicals were made available to some source which triggered the fire some 
ignition source whether it was inside the room or whether it was outside of the 
room. The fire burned there and in my view this then becomes a res ipsa case, 
o.k. 
6The construction of Stockroom A was established at R. 848, 920-21. 
7See Mark Karamesines testimony at R. 847. 
13 
(R. 1016-17), See Addendum D in Plaintiffs principle brief. Since there are not numerous other 
possible causes for the fire at Parish Chemical, res ipsa loquitur is applicable. Cf. Barnhill v. 
Young Electric Sign Co., 13 Utah 2d 347, 374 P.2d 311 (1962)(numerous other possible causes 
identified). 
Defendant's citation of Victoria Park Apartments, Inc. v. Axelson. 367 N.W.2d 
155 (N.D. 1985) exposes the weakness in defendant's logic. In Victoria Park one of three 
persons was found to have probably left a cigarette on a couch which started a fire, but the 
plaintiff did not know exactly who left the cigarette. The controlling distinction to be made is 
that applied to the present case, all three persons would have been employees of Parish Chemical 
and thus within Parish's control. In sum, the facts upon which Victoria Park rested are not 
present in the present matter. Moreover, the analysis in Victoria Park begs the question. If the 
plaintiff could tell the jury who threw the cigarette which came in contact with the couch, res 
ipsa loquitur would not apply. 
There simply exists no presumption against the application of res ipsa loquitur 
when the case involves a fire.8 Instead, this court should recognize that no Utah court has ever 
8For cases applying res ipsa loquitur to fires, see Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. 
Midgett. 116 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1941); Pine Ford. Inc. v. Shankle. 528 S.W. 2d 392 (Ark. 
1975); Megee v. Reed. 482 S.W. 2d 832 (Ark. 1972); Oakdale Building Corp. v. Smithereen 
Co.. 54 N.E. 2d 231 (111. Ct. App. 1944); Cox v. Stafford. 460 S.W. 2d 818 (Ky. 1970); 
Commonwealth v. Montour Transport Co.. 73 A.2d 659 (Penn. 1950); Olswanger v. Funk. 470 
S.W. 2d 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970); Southern Gas Corp. v. Brooks. 359 S.W. 2d 570 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1961). 
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made any statement that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable when a fire is involved.9 
This court should follow common sense, past Utah cases, and the court in Olswanger v. Funk, 
470 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970) where the court stated: 
Counsel for defendant cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions, many of 
which deny the application of [res ipsa loquitur] in fire cases, but it is apparent 
from an examination of these cases that the courts hold, in the last analysis, that 
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, or lack of application, must of 
necessity depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 
Id. at 15. "[W]hether a fire case falls within the operation and scope of the res ipsa loquitur 
rule must of necessity depend upon the particular facts and circumstances appearing in the 
individual case." Id at 15-16 citing Menth v. Breeze Corp., 73 A.2d 183, 186 (N.J. 1950). 
When the particular circumstances of this case are reviewed, this court will find 
that the foundation for res ipsa loquitur was established. The jury properly decided whether a 
room full of chemicals all in sealed containers would burn if due care had been used. Plaintiff 
established to a reasonable degree the absence of other causes of the fire. Thus, plaintiff did 
establish that the fire at Parish Chemical was not the kind of fire which ordinarily occurs absent 
negligence. 
9Ballow v.Monroe, 699 P.2d 719 (Utah 1985); Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 
5 Utah 2d 373, 302 P.2d 471 (1956); Barnhill v. Young Electric Sign Co.. 13 Utah 2d 347, 374 
P.2d211 (1962). 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in concluding that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima 
facie case and provide the necessary foundation for res ipsa loquitur. Thus, the court should not 
have thrown out the jury's verdict which found Parish Chemical negligent under the 
circumstances and that its negligence caused the damages that the plaintiff suffered. The trial 
court's order granting defendant's judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be reversed, and 
the verdict of the jury should be reinstated. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 27^day of December, 1995. 
DAVn3~&. MORTENSEN 
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